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 This paper tries to analyze the interrelationship between possibilities of conflict in cross 
border mergers and acquisitions and firm and market characteristics in a two country 
three firm model. We show that in general an increase in asymmetry across firms reduces 
the possibility of conflict between jurisdictions over merger review decisions. We also 
show that possibility of conflict increase with the increase in market asymmetries across 
countries. We also discuss interaction of asymmetry in firm and market size with the 
distribution of firms across countries and its effect on the possibilities of conflict. 
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Conflict in Cross Border Mergers 






Cross border merger and acquisitions affect markets of more than one country. 
Consequently, the review of such mergers involves multiple jurisdictions. The assertion 
of  jurisdiction  by  any  country  in  such  cases  is  usually  determined  by  the  “effects 
doctrine” (Mavroidis and Neven 1999).  According to this doctrine, a country can claim 
antitrust jurisdiction over any anticompetitive activity that affects their domestic markets, 
irrespective  of  the  location  or  nationality  of  the  participants  involved  (Bode  and 
Budzinski 2005).  While this arrangement provides a safeguard to the domestic markets, 
the interests of the global economy and international competition are adversely affected 
since  national  regulatory  authorities  take  into  account  the  effect  of  the  merger  or 
acquisition on their home country only  disregarding its effect on foreign countries or the 
world economy as a whole (Evenett and Hijzen 2006). This in turn increases the scope of 
conflict between jurisdictions over merger reviews (Klien 2000).  
 
Although the issue of cross border merger conflict got much highlighted after the 
GE/Honeywell  merger  case  in  2001,  instances  of  differences  between  international 
authorities over assessment of merger effects leading to potential conflicts can be traced 
back to early 1990s
2.  For instance, in the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger case in 1996 
the EU member states were not adversely affected by the deal while the U.S market faced 
a more anti-competitive situation. Consequently, the European Union did not propose any 
remedial  measures  but  U.S  authorities  demanded  divestitures  in  all  the  product 
categories. This shows that w hen countries are concerned with their national markets  
only and a merger  affects different countries differently the outcome of its review  is 
likely to differ across jurisdictions.  The nature of the effect of a merger on a particular 
                                                 
2 Conflict between jurisdictions occurred in de Havilland/Aerospatiale/Alenia acquisition (1991), Boeing 
McDonnell Douglas merger (1996), Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger (1996) and Gencor and Lonrho merger 
(1999).   
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country depends on the characteristics of the national firms, markets and the distribution 
of the merging and rival firms across the countries, etc. For instance, in the 1996 Boeing 
McDonnell Douglas merger, one of the concerns of the authorities was related to the 
effect on efficiencies in the presence of high market concentration and high market shares 
(Stock 1999). This has important implications in the context of mergers across advanced 
and  developing  countries  where  the  firms  belonging  to  the  two  sets  of  countries  are 
different in terms of the cost structures and at the same time there is a marked difference 
between country characteristics.  
 
In  this  paper  we  attempt  to  analyze  the  possibilities  of  conflict  between 
jurisdictions over mergers involving firms with either asymmetric costs or market sizes. 
We also take into account the effect of the interplay of the distribution of firms across 
countries with firm and market size. Finally, we analyze the possibilities of conflicts 
between firms located in the same country having international effects. 
   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the related 
literature. The general model is developed in Section 3. In Section 4 and 5, we analyze 
the  results  for  asymmetry  in  firm  size  and  market  size  in  a  two  country  three  firm 
framework. The case of merger of national firms with international effect is discussed in 
Section 6. This is followed by concluding remarks in Section 7. 
   
2.0 Background literature 
 
  Cross border mergers and acquisitions account for a significant share (25%) of the 
total merger and acquisition activity worldwide, of which horizontal mergers account for 
70% (UNCTAD 2000). Horizontal merger involves two major issues. First of all, these 
mergers tend to be anti-competitive, particularly in the absence of efficiency gains as they 
lead to increased industry concentration and increase in prices for consumers (Farrell and 
Shapiro 1990).  Secondly, a merger may allow firms to realize synergies which in turn 
make  them  efficient.  These  synergies  might  help  the  merging  firms  to  outweigh  the  
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advantage which accrues to the rival firm via the “merger paradox
3” effect. Thus, firms 
will  merge  only  if  the  synergies  are  sufficiently  large  to  offset  the  competitive 
disadvantage. Further, if the efficiencies are very large they can also lead to decrease in 
prices  faced by the consumers.  But  even if they  do not,  competition  authorities may 
approve a horizontal merger if the efficiency gains outweigh the losses resulting to the 
merging firms. This issue is crucial in cross border mergers and acquisitions where the 
authorities are generally concerned with the efficiency gains accruing to their domestic 
residents, both firms and consumers (Evenett and Hijzen 2006).  
 
Thus, differences in the distribution or characteristics of the firms and consumers 
across different countries may lead to conflict in jurisdictions with one of the countries 
approving a merger and the other blocking it which is the focus of this paper.  To the best 
of our knowledge, this issue has not been dealt in the literature so far. However, there 
have been discussions on the possible effects that firm and market characteristics might 
have on mergers, which we discuss next.  
 
For an industry, consisting of almost symmetric firms, there is little potential gain 
from merger since mergers have zero effect as the firms are equally efficient (Barros 
1998). On the other hand, in case of industries with asymmetric firm sizes and efficiency, 
there is potential for gain through shifting of production. Froeb, Timothy and Werden 
(1998) examine the welfare effects of merger in an industry characterized by Demsetz 
postulate, which holds that the growth of large firms is attributed to cost and product 
advantages over their rivals. He argues that in such a setting if a firm’s marginal cost 
advantage is shared with its merging partner, mergers would lead to cost savings. This in 
turn would make mergers welfare enhancing. Welfare gains arise because a merger leads 
to a shift in production from merging to non-merging firms. When small or medium sized 
firms merge, there is a shift in production to the larger firms, which in turn has lower 
costs. Welfare gains can also arise because merger allows firms to shift production from 
                                                 
3 Salant et al (1983) showed that under Cournot Competition, merger between a subset of firms always 
benefits the rival firms at the cost of the merging firms unless at least 80% of the firms in the market 
merge, when the mergers involve no efficiency gain. This phenomena is referred to as merger paradox  
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one firm to another. For instance, merger between a large and small firm might shift 
production from the small to the large firms. 
 
In  Cournot  equilibrium,  as  Farrell  and  Shapiro  (1990)  argue  large  firms  have 
lower marginal cost; so welfare is enhanced if a fixed total output is shifted towards them 
and away from smaller, less efficient firms. Large firms may be large because they are 
efficient. If so, then economic welfare may be enhanced if these efficient firms acquire 
more  of  the  industry’s  productive  capital  and  thus  increase  their  market  share.  They 
further argue that the larger the market share of the participating firms, or the smaller is 
the  industry  elasticity  of  demand,  the  greater  must  be  the  learning  effects  or  scale 
economies in order for price to fall. 
 
In an asymmetric industry with different capital levels, production is carried out 
inefficiently  since  marginal  costs  are  not  equal.  This  provides  scope  for  merger  to 
increase welfare, since it can lead to more efficient production by making the industry 
“more symmetric”. However, mergers will diminish industry output, thereby reducing 
consumer surplus (McAfee and Williams 1992). This leads to the possibility of conflict 
between jurisdictions if they have an asymmetric distribution of the market or firms.  
 
The location of headquarter of firms across the countries with jurisdiction also 
determines the way a merger would affect the welfare of a country (Head and Reis 1997), 
whenever  the  assertion  of  jurisdiction  depends  on  the  presence  of  firm  headquarters. 
Neven and Roller (1999) illustrate this problem with the help of an extreme example. 
They argue that if there are two countries, hosting one firm each and there is a third 
country with all consumers then no merger would be blocked by authorities even if they 
do not involve efficiency. In this context, Mehra (2008) shows that distribution of firms 
across jurisdictions influences the impact of a merger on the welfare of the countries and 
thereby  on  the  possibilities  of  conflict  even  when  the  allocation  of  jurisdiction  is 




Market size also plays an important role in determining the effect of mergers. Qiu 
(2006) has shown that large markets are a pre-condition to form alliances which in turn 
facilitate inflow of FDI. Head and Reis (1997) determine the critical share of consumers 
that  should  be  present  in  a  country  to  ensure  that  it  rejects  world  welfare  reducing 
mergers.  They  find  that  when  there  is  no  cost  savings  involved  in  a  merger,  only 
countries  with  low  share  of  world  consumption  would  clear  world  welfare  reducing 
mergers. On the other hand, when merger involves cost savings, if any country with 
jurisdiction represents more than half of world consumption, it would clear only mergers 
which  lead  to  increase  in  welfare.  Analyzing  the  effect  of  market  size  on  conflicts 
between  jurisdictions,  Neven  and  Roller  (2000)  find  that  difference  in  market  size 
between two countries becomes relevant when the countries define the relevant market 
differently. And in such a case the possibility of conflict between cross border mergers 
and acquisitions is reduced with the increase in the inequality in sizes when market shares 
are positively correlated across markets.   
 
In this paper as mentioned earlier, we try to analyze whether firm and market 
characteristics have an effect on conflicts between jurisdictions over international merger 
reviews. In particular we are concerned with the firm characteristics, as captured by cost 
structure  and  consumer  heterogeneity  captured  by  market  size.  We  also  discuss  the 
interaction between these factors and the distribution of firms across countries.    
3.0 General Model: 
 
Following Gibbons (1992), we develop a two country model with firm and market 
asymmetry. Consider two countries  B A i ,  with  i N  firms. Firm  j  belonging to country 
i   sells  an  amount  ji h   in  the  home  country  and  exports  an  amount  ji e   to  the  other 







ji i i e h a P
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The profit of Firm  j  belonging to Country i  is given by 
 
ji j k ji j i ji e c P h c P                 (2) 
Where  j c  is the marginal cost in firm  j . In this paper, we assume that there are no fixed 
costs and hence marginal cost is equal to average cost. This is a simplifying assumption 
to avoid complications in calculations. 
Welfare of Country i  is given by 
 
k i j l Q W
i N
j




2                (3) 
 





i i Q CS                     (4) 
 
World Welfare is given by the sum of welfare of all countries and the consumer surplus. 
 
Assume that the firms choose their quantities simultaneously. Then the optimal 





























Suppose now two firms belonging to two different countries merge. The incentive 
to merge arises from cost savings in terms of a decrease in post merger marginal cost for 
the merging firms. The post-merger marginal cost is given by M c . We assume that  M c is 
at least less than the marginal cost of the high cost firm, otherwise merger will not take 
place.  The  post  merger  marginal  cost  M c   can  be  interpreted  as  the  measure  of 
efficiency. Higher the value of  M c , i.e. closer the value of the post-merger marginal cost, 
lower will be the efficiency and vice-versa. By efficiency in this case we mean technical 
efficiency which in turn is defined as lower input cost to obtain the same level of output. 






















jB B B e h h b a P               (8) 
 
where MB MA M h h h is the total output of the merged firm. We assume that when firms 
from  two  different  countries  merge  the  merged  firm  operates  in  both  countries  as  a 
domestic firm, implying  0 M e . The profit of the merged firm is given by 
 
MB M B MA M A
M h c P h c P               (9) 
 
In this case, both the firms are located in different countries. We assume that the 
firms  divide  their  profit  using  the  symmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution  where  the 
disagreement points are given by the pre-merger profit levels. The profit of each merging 
partner after merger is given by  B A i
M
i , , . 
 
The profit of a representative non-merged Firm  j  in Country  i  after merger of the two 
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Assuming that the merged and rival firms choose their quantities simultaneously 
after  firms  merge  the  optimal  quantities  of  the  non  merged  firms  under  Cournot 
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,  B A i ,               (13) 
 
Substituting  these  values  in  the  expression  for  profit,  welfare  and  consumer 
surplus for the pre and post-merger cases, we obtain their optimized values.  
 
Next,  in  order  to  compare  the  pre  and  post-merger  situations  of  the  firms, 
consumers and the countries we define a variable  
 
X X X





D X , to determine the value of the post-merger marginal cost  M c  which 
corresponds to the point of indifference between the pre and post-merger levels. We refer 
to them as the threshold level of each of the parties concerned.  
 
  In  the  rest  of  the  paper  we  consider  the  case  of  three  firms 3 N .  Firm  1 
belongs  to  Country  A  and  Firm  2  and  3  belong  to  Country  B  2 , 1 B A N N . 
Throughout the paper we assume that Firm 1 and Firm 2 merge. We assume three firms 
to simplify our analysis. It must be noted here that our results are not completely driven 
by the number of firms. The number of firms would affect the results only in the case 
when we assume that the firms are identical and their distribution across the countries is 
equal (in case of even number of firms), given that both the countries have identical 
market size. Next, consider some special cases. 
 
 
4.0 Asymmetric costs - Two country three firm model 
 
 Assume  1 B A a a , i.e. both the countries have the same market size, which in 
turn is normalized to one. We determine the value of the post merger marginal cost of the 
merging firm which makes each country indifferent between the pre and post-merger 
welfare levels of their respective countries. The expression for post merger marginal cost 
corresponding to the point of indifference turns out to be complicated and intractable. 
Hence, the values are approximated to their nearest squares to draw implications about 
the marginal cost. We obtain two values for the threshold level of post merger marginal 
cost. We consider only those values which satisfy the condition: M c  should be at least less 
than the pre-merger marginal cost of the highest cost firm. The approximation procedure 
is discussed in the Appendix I for one case. The rest of the cases follow similarly
4.  
 
We  compare  the  post -merger  marginal  cost  corresponding  to  the  point  of 
indifference of the merging firms and the two countries to draw implications about the 
                                                 
4 Details are available on request.  
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possibilities of conflict. The merging firms will propose a merger so long as the actual 
post-merger  marginal  cost  is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  post-merger  marginal  cost 
corresponding to the point where the pre-merger and post-merger profits of the merging 
firm become equal. Similarly, each country will approve a merger if the corresponding 
post-merger marginal cost is either less than or equal to their respective threshold levels. 
Then we discuss the results and summarize them in the form of propositions. The proofs 
of the same are given in Appendix I. 
  
To illustrate the case of asymmetric cost firms we assume three relationships 
 
1.  Two high cost firms merge. 3 2 1 2 c c c  where  0is the measure 
































M c c c : when 
13
25
  and 
644
285





,  and 
644
285
1 c  i.e. for low to moderate asymmetry across firms, where 
25
1
1 c  
 
   Comparing the lower bounds of the post merger marginal costs, we observe that 
when firms are nearly symmetric i.e. when   is very low as compared to  1 c , possibilities 
of  conflict  do  not  exist,  since  no    merger  proposed  by  the  merging  firms  would  be 
blocked by authorities in either Country A or Country B. On the other hand, when the 
firms are asymmetric, i.e.   is moderately large then the merging firms require relatively  
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less incentives to merge. In this case, there is possibility of some conflict between the two 
jurisdictions over merger review, since any merger proposed by the merging firms would 
be approved by Country B but blocked by Country A. Comparing the position of Country 
A and B, it is observed that the threshold level of Country B lies to the right of that of 
Country A. This could be attributed to the presence of rival firm in Country B. The rival 
firm’s profit is directly proportional to the post-merger marginal cost of the merged firm. 
When the firms are low to moderately asymmetric, the effect of the profit of the rival 
firm dominates over the effect of the profit of one of the merging firms and the consumer 
surplus in Country B. Hence the efficiency requirement of Country B is low as compared 
to Country A, implying that Country B approves mergers involving relatively higher post 
merger  marginal  cost.  This,  in  turn,  leads  to  conflict  between  the  two  authorities. 
However, since the efficiency requirement of the merging firms is higher than that of 
country B, the conflict region would be small.     
   
These results are illustrated in Figure 1a and 1b. In the figures 
A W  and 
B W  
represent  the  difference  between  pre  and  post-merger  welfares  of  country  A  and  B 
respectively. 
*
M  represents difference between the pre and post -merger profit for the 
merging firm. The points at which the respective curves intersect the horizontal axis 
represent the threshold level of the post merger marginal cost for both the countries and 
the merging firm. In Figure 1a, there would be no conflict since the firms would propose 
mergers if the post-merger marginal cost lies to the left of  A A  and in this region both the 
countries would approve the merger. In Figure1b, on the other hand, the merging firms 
do not propose any merger if the post merger marginal cost of the merged firm lies to the 
right of the region F F . Any merger to the left of E E will be cleared by both countries 
and there would not be any conflict. However, any merger for which the post merger 
marginal cost of the merged firm lies in the region between  E E and  F F , there would be 
conflict where Country B approves the merger but Country A would block it.  
 
2.  Two low cost firms merge  0 , 2 3 2 1 c c c :  












M c c c ,  when 
176
61
  i.e.  the  firms  asymmetry  is  low,  where 
61
76








M c c c , when 
198
161
 i.e. the firms are highly asymmetric 
 
When two low cost firms merge, the post merger marginal cost corresponding to the 
point  of  indifference  for  the  merging  firms  is  less  than  that  of  both  Country  A  and 
Country B. Thus, in this case there is no conflict as in Case 1.   We observe that the 
acceptance region of Country B lies to the right of Country A. Following the reasoning of 
Case 1, this can be attributed to the presence of rival firm in Country B. The rival firm’s 
profit is positively related to the post merger marginal cost of the merging firm and hence 
it drives down the efficiency requirement. For Country B, the welfare effect of the rival 
firm dominates over that of the consumer and the merging firm and hence we observe 
that Country B is willing to clear the merger even at a higher post merger marginal cost 
or low efficiency.  In this case, the possibility of conflict increases as the asymmetry 
between the firms increases. As the asymmetry across the firms increase, it becomes 
more beneficial for the merging firms to merge. This can be attributed to the fact that 
when a high cost and low cost firm merge, the firms can benefit by transferring the 
production from the relatively high cost to the least cost firm. This in turn reduces the 
efficiency requirement of merging firms and hence they find the incentive to merge even 
at  low  levels  of  efficiency  as  captured  by  higher  post-merger  marginal  cost  of  the 
merging firm. Further, with the increase in asymmetry across firms, the effect of the rival 






3.  The highest cost and least cost firms merge 3 2 1 c c c  where  0,  
 
Again, comparing the point of indifference of the merging firms, Country A and Country 








M c c , when  0 i.e. 
8
3
1 c and 
51
8




1 c  
 








M c c c , otherwise. 
 
When a high cost firm merges with the low cost firm, there is a low incentive for 
the firms to merge. The firms will merge only when the merger involves high efficiency 
gains as captured by a low post merger marginal cost. For Country A, both consumer 
welfare effect and the effect of the profit of one of the merging firms require higher 
efficiency as compared to Country B, where it is the effect of the profit of the rival firm 
which dominates the welfare effect of the consumers and profit of one of the merging 
firms. In this case there exists no possibility of conflict between the jurisdictions owing to 
the high threshold level of the merging firms. Hence in this case, any merger proposed by 
the merging firms will be cleared by both countries.  However, when the firms are more 
asymmetric,  the  merging  firms  take  advantage  of  shifting  production  from  higher  to 
lower cost firm, assuming that there is no capacity constraint. This in turn reduces the 
efficiency  requirement  of  the  merging  firms  but  increases  the  possibility  of  conflict 
between jurisdictions. Here again we find Country B has a greater acceptance region as 
compared  to  Country  A.  As  the  asymmetry  increases,  the  efficiency  requirement  of 




Combining  the  results  of  the  above  three  cases  we  obtain  the  following  two 
propositions.  
 
Proposition 1: With the increase in asymmetry across firms, the efficiency requirement 
of the merging firms  
a.  Increases when two high cost firms merge 
b.  Decreases when two low cost firms merge 
c.  Increases in absolute terms and relative to the requirement of the Country, 
where the rival firm resides, but decreases relative to the requirement of 
the other country, when a high and a low cost firm merge. 
 
Proposition 2: With the increase in asymmetry across firms, the possibility of conflict 
between jurisdictions over the review of a cross border merger increases irrespective of 
the cost structure of the two merging firms.  
 
We further observe that when two least cost firms merge, then an increase in the 
asymmetry between the firms leads to a reduction in the efficiency requirement of the 
merging firms. However, when two highest cost firms or a high cost and low cost firm 
merge, the efficiency requirement increases with the increase in asymmetry between the 
firms. This can be attributed to the fact that as the asymmetry across the firms increase, 
the rival firm which has lesser cost than at least one of the merging firm in this case will 
derive more advantage from the merger. Hence in order to gain profits, the merging firms 
need more and more incentives in the form of efficiency gains to merge. In other words, 
in case of a merger involving at least one cost firm, when the asymmetry becomes very 
high, merging firms gain from merger only at high levels of efficiency or low levels of 
M c . This, in turn implies that the incentive to merge for two firms will depend on their 
relative positions in terms of the cost structure. These two implications are summarized in 




Proposition 3: Efficiency requirement of merging firms decreases with the increase in 
asymmetry across all firms, when merger occurs between two low cost firms. But the 
opposite holds when at least one of the merging firms is the highest cost firm. 
 
 
Proposition 4:  
a.  Irrespective of the firm and market size, the two highest cost firms have the least 
incentive to merge. 
b.   When the firm and market size are comparable, the two least cost firms have the 
highest incentive to merge but when the market is very large as compared to the 




5.0 Market Size or Consumer Heterogeneity 
 
  In the previous section we assumed homogeneous equal sized markets. In this 
section we relax this assumption. Let  B A i ai ,   denote the market size country  i . 
Further assume that  c c c c 3 2 1  to focus on our key concern.  In this case, the point 
of indifference between the pre and post -merger level of profit for the merging firm is 
given by: 
 
c a c a c a c a c a a c B A B A B A M 8 5 5 4 2 2
8
1 2 2     (15) 
 





, holds definitely for  j i a or or a while 
      it does not hold for  j i i j a a or a a ,  j i j i,  
 
Thus,  as  market  size  increases,  the  incentive  to  merge  as  measured  by  the 
decrease  in  post-merger  marginal  cost  of  the  merging  firm  should  increase.  In  other  
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words, as market size increases, the efficiency or cost savings as measured by a decrease 
in  M c increases. This in turn increases the incentive to merge for the merging firms. This 
holds so long as one of the markets is not very large. However, if one of the markets is 
very large as compared to the other, then a unit increase in the size of the other market 
would require less efficiency incentive for firms to merge.  Next,  we  discuss  the 
possibilities of conflict. We consider two cases. In order to simplify our analysis, we 
assume the following:  
 








M c c c  
   
Possibility of conflict exists, since some of the mergers cleared by country A 
(country  with  large  market  size) would  be  blocked  by  Country  B.  The  possibility  of 
conflict  increases  with  the  increase  in  the  difference  in  the  market  size  between  the 
markets of the two countries. Further, there are some mergers which would not be cleared 
by either country. Moreover, larger the market size, lesser is the efficiency requirement to 
clear a merger in a cross border merger. If we take  0, we obtain the case  B A a a . In 
this  case  also  we  obtain  the  same  relationship  between  the  threshold  post  merger 
marginal cost of the two countries and the merging firm. We then obtain the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: When two firms belonging to two different countries merge,  
a.  Possibilities of conflict between the jurisdiction of two countries increase with 
increase in the gap between the market sizes of two countries.  
b.  The  decision  of  the  firms  and  the  two  countries  with  regard  to  merger  is 




Next,  we  discuss  the  response  of  the  post  merger  welfare  levels  of  the  two 
countries to a change in market size in either country and the change in post-merger 
marginal cost of the merged firm. For country A, we observe that for a given level of 
efficiency, as the market size in its own country or the other country increases post-
merger welfare would increase. Further, for a given market size, if the efficiency falls, the 
welfare would fall. For Country B, though the effect of a change in market size of either 
country is same as in case of Country A, the effect of change in efficiency depends on the 
market size of Country A and post merger cost differential between the merging and rival 
firms. In particular, if the market size in country A is very large and/or a very low cost 
differential  exists,  i.e.  M c is  very  close  to  c ,  the  welfare  of  Country  B  after  merger 
increases with a fall in efficiency. In this case, it’s the rival’s profit which dominates the 
welfare of Country B. On the other hand, if there are high efficiency gains involved and 
the  consumer  surplus  effect  dominates,  Country  B’s  welfare  responds  positively  to 
efficiency gains. In other words in this case, the post merger marginal cost of the merged 
firm is very low as compared to the pre merger cost, this in turn adversely affects the 
rivals. This also implies that Country A’s market is not very large. Interestingly, we 
observe that in case of the welfare of Country B, its own market size does not play any 
role. This comparative static result is shown in the Appendix II.  
 
 
6.0 Other Distributions of Firms 
 
So far we have assumed that the merging firms are located in different countries 
i.e. we have considered cross border mergers. Next, we assume that the merging firms are 
located in the same country. We consider two separate distributions of the rival firm. 
First, we assume that the rival firm belongs to the second country. The second case is one 
where all firms belong to the same country but still the other country has jurisdictions 
following the “effects doctrine” as discussed in the Introduction. The general model is 





6.1 Firm Size  
 
When the merging firms belong to Country A and rival firms belong to Country 
B, we observe that if two high cost firms merge, in case of symmetric to moderately 
asymmetric firms, the possibility of conflict exists since there are some mergers which 
would be proposed by the merging firm and would be cleared by Country A, but will be 
blocked by Country B. However, when firms are highly asymmetric, there is no conflict 
between the jurisdictions involved, since here the two highest cost merging firms have a 
very low incentive to merge and the rival firm would enjoy most being an outsider as it is 






M c c c .  This  implies  that,  in  this  case  the  possibility  of  conflict  exists  when 
Country  A  blocks  the  merger  but  Country  B  clears  it.  However,  in  this  case  the 
possibility of conflict is smaller than the case when the two high cost firms merge. If 
instead, the high cost firm merges with the low cost firm, then possibility of conflict 
exists. When the firms are asymmetric, then mergers cleared by Country A are blocked 
by Country B, while the reverse occurs when the firms are not very asymmetric.  
 
Consider the case when all firms belong to Country A and two high cost firms 
merge. We observe that in this case there is a possibility of conflict, when Country B 
blocks the mergers that are proposed by the merging firms, but Country A would clear it. 
Similar results follow for the case of two least cost firms merging and when a high cost 
and low cost firm merge. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Thus, we observe that in case of mergers between firms belonging to the same 
country  with  international  effects,  conflicts  between  jurisdictions  increase  with  the 








6.2 Market Size 
 
When we consider the interaction between the distribution of firms and relative 
market size, we observe that in case the merging firms and rival firm belong to different 
countries, possibility of conflict increases when the market size of Country B (where the 
rival firm is located) is higher than the market size of Country A. When Country B has a 
higher market size, it will clear a merger only when there are substantial efficiency gains, 
since a larger share of consumers get affected by the merger in a country characterized by 
a large market size. When both the merging and rival firms belong to the same country, 
we find that no merger is cleared by either country. In this case, the post merger marginal 
cost of the merging firm is not sufficient to make the countries indifferent between the 
pre and post-merger situations. On the other hand, when the market size in Country A is 
larger, any merger proposed by the merging firms would be cleared by both countries, 
hence there would not be any conflict. The results are summarized in Table 2. Thus the 
relative market size of the two countries has an impact on conflict possibilities when the 
merging firms are located in the same country but does not make any difference in case 




  In the paper, we analyze the interrelationship between firm and market size and 
the distribution of firms to determine their effect on the possibility of conflict between 
jurisdictions over international mergers. We find that in case of cross border mergers the 
possibilities of conflict would always increase with the increase in asymmetry across the 
firms. This holds in case of merger between national firms with international effects as 
well. The size of the zone of conflict depends on the location of the rival firm. Thus 
possibilities of conflict across jurisdictions are same irrespective of whether dissimilar 
firms  belonging  to  the  same  country  merge  rather  than  when  dissimilar  firms  across 
countries merge.  
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In case of market size, the greater the difference between the markets of the two 
countries with jurisdiction, higher is the possibility of conflict. However, we also observe 
that  the  relative  market  size  of  both  countries  does  not  make  any  difference  in  the 
possibilities of conflicts between jurisdictions. In other words, in a two country three firm 
model with difference in market size, whether the rival firm is located in a country with 
bigger or smaller market size does not have any effect on the possibilities of conflict. On 
the other hand, in case of mergers between firms located in the same country, the relative 
market size of the two countries becomes a decisive factor in determining the possibilities 
of conflict across countries.  
 
Since asymmetry in firm and market size involve tedious calculations it becomes 
difficult  to  obtain  accurate  results.  However,  these  approximations  do  not  affect  the 
general direction of the results and thus we can draw implications from it. Our results 
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The post merger marginal cost which makes the merging firms indifferent 
between the pre and post-merger situation is given by 
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1 3 2 1 3
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Substituting  1 a  and  3 2 1 2 c c c  where  0, we get, 
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396 260 184 306 180 72 8 128 64 64 1 1
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1 1 c c c c
 
 
We express the term inside the square root in terms of its nearest square, 
2
1 17 13 8 c . Comparing the term inside the square root with the 
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Similarly, we determine the approximate values of the post merger marginal costs for the 
rest of the cases
5. The values are summarized in the following table. 
  
 
Table 1: Value of the threshold post merger marginal cost for merging firm, Country A 
and B 
 





264 168 128 1 c
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* In cases  0 3 , 1 X and in Case 0 , 2 X  
                                                 







Proof of Proposition 1  
To prove proposition1, we take the threshold post-merger marginal cost of the 
merging firms and differentiate it with respect to  , the measure of asymmetry in cost 
across firms. 








, this proves part a of proposition 1 
 
Part b 




















, this implies that the efficiency requirement increases in absolute 
terms. 
 
To prove the second part of part c in proposition 1, we compare the threshold 
level of post merger marginal cost of the merging firm  3
M
M c  with that of Country A 
3
A
M c  and Country B  3
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 i.e. asymmetry across firms 























M c c always 
 
Thus, as  increases, the efficiency requirement of the merging firm as compared 
to that of country A falls but rises as compared to Country B, i.e. the country where the 
rival firm resides. This proves part c of proposition 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
 
To prove proposition 2, we compare the threshold post-merger marginal cost of 
the merging firms  X c
M
M  and the two countries  X c
A
M  and  X c
B
M   as given in Table 
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1 c  i.e. for low to moderate asymmetry across firms 












1 c  for very low asymmetry 




For proof b, we take  0in proof of part a of proposition 2. 
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M c c c ,  when 
198
161
  i.e.  the  firms  are  highly  asymmetric. 
Comparing  these  two  results,  we  can  say  that  as  the  firm  asymmetry  increases,  the 
possibility of conflict increases from a situation of no conflict. 
This proves the part b of the proposition 2 
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M c c , for low asymmetry 
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Proof of Proposition 3:  
 
Proof follows directly from proposition 1.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
 
We denote the post merger marginal cost of the merging firms corresponding to 




M c c  and  3
M
M c  
respectively. To prove proposition 4, we compare the threshold post-merger marginal 
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This proves Proposition 4. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
 
When  the  market  size  of  the  two  countries  differs,  the  threshold  post  merger 






For Country A and B, the post-merger marginal cost which makes the authorities 
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In the product heterogeneity case, the point of indifference between the pre and 
post-merger level for the merging firm is given by: 
c a c a c a c a c a a c B A B A B A M 8 5 5 4 2 2
8
1 2 2  
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General model when firms belonging to the same country merge  
 
In particular, suppose two firms in Country A merge to form FirmM . Then the 
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Where  M M e h , represent the domestic consumption and export share of the merged firm’s 
output.  
  
The post merger marginal cost of the merged firm is given by M c c . The profit of the 
merged firm is given as 
 
M M B M M A
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The output of the merged firm is given as: 













The output of the non-merged firm is given by (12) in the text in Section 3.0  
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Figure 1a: Distribution of threshold post merger marginal cost when the two high cost 
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    Figure 1b: Distribution of threshold post-merger marginal cost when the two high cost 




Table 2: Possibilities of conflict between the two jurisdictions, when merging firms 
belong to the same country 
 
  Firm 1 and 2 belong to country A, Firm 3 
belongs to Country B 
All firms belong to 
Country A 
Firm Size  Symmetric  Asymmetric   
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More Conflict  No Conflict  Less Conflict 
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Less Conflict  Less Conflict 
One high cost and 
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Table 3: Relative position of the point of indifference between the pre and post-merger 
situations of the merging firms and the two countries 
 
  Firm 1 and 2 belong to 
country A, Firm 3 belongs to 
Country B 
All firms belong to 
Country A 
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